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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

MARK ANTHONY CRUSE,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

NO. 40033
Bannock Co. Case No.
CR-2011-14768

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

________________ )

Has Cruse failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing concurrent unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed, upon his
guilty pleas to principal to delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
deliver, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence?

Cruse Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On August 22, 2011, Cruse and his associate sold approximately 26.3 grams of
cocaine to a confidential informant for $950.00.
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(PSI, p.3.) Two days later, officers

executed a search warrant on Cruse's residence and found 25.8 grams of cocaine
inside his toilet tank and a digital scale and drug ledger in the bedroom. (PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Cruse with principal to delivery of cocaine and possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver.

(R., pp.52-53.)

The matter was subsequently

consolidated with a case charging Cruse with trafficking in cocaine. (R., pp.77-78; PSI,
p.6.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Cruse pied guilty to principal to delivery of cocaine
and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and the state dismissed the trafficking
charge and agreed to recommend unified sentences of seven years, with three years
fixed. (R., pp.87-90; 3/19/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-19.) The district court imposed concurrent
unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.95-98.) Cruse filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp .105-07.) He also filed a
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp.101-02, 116-17.)
Cruse asserts that the district court abused its discretion by declining to place
him in the retained jurisdiction program, in light of his claim that "the social science
literature on deterrence demonstrates that sentencing [Cruse] to a seven year prison
term and not allowing him to participate in the rider program even though he appears to
be amenable to rehabilitation will not create any additional general deterrent effect than
would allowing a rider." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.)

Cruse has failed to establish an

abuse of sentencing discretion.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
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(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.

kb

(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kb

The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion
of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).
The primary purpose of a district court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to
obtain

additional

information

regarding

whether the

defendant

has

sufficient

rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677,
115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).
jurisdiction.

kb

Probation is the ultimate goal of retained

There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient

evidence before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for
probation.

kb

On appeal, Cruse claims that the district court's only "reason for not allowing
[him] to participate in the rider program was because the court believed that a longer
sentence was necessary to serve as a deterrent to others who would otherwise commit
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drug offenses." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Cruse's entire argument focuses on the merits
of deterrence as a sentencing objective, and he supports his claims with randomly
selected "social science" articles that are not contained in the record. (Appellant's brief,
pp.5-6.) Even though deterrence, both general and specific, is a statutorily authorized
sentencing consideration (Idaho Code § 19-2521 (d) and (e)) and has long been
recognized as one of the four primary goals of sentencing (State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982)), Cruse quibbles with this legal authority by citing to
two articles that indicate legal punishment is ineffective or has a "negligible" effect as a
deterrent. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6). Immediately thereafter, Cruse contradicts himself
by citing a third article that indicates legal punishment does indeed have a deterrent
effect, but "the perceived severity of the punishment does not." (Appellant's brief, p.6.)
Cruse altogether ignores the goals of community protection and retribution and instead
relies on the three "social science" articles to support his claim that prison is not
necessary as a deterrent for any person who "appears to be" amenable to rehabilitation.
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Contrary to Cruse's argument, it is not appropriate for a court to
discount the primary objective of sentencing - protection of society - or to rely solely on
excerpts from "social science literature" as a basis for its sentencing decision rather
than considering the governing sentencing criteria.
In this case, the district court articulated its consideration of all four of the
sentencing objectives and appropriately determined that a prison sentence was
necessary to meet the goals of protection of society, retribution, and deterrence. (See
5/7/12 Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.25.) The instant crimes are not Cruse's first offenses.
Although was only 24 years old when he committed the instant felony offenses, Cruse
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had already accumulated at least 11 misdemeanor convictions and incurred several
probation violations.

(PSI, pp.4-7.)

The presentence investigator determined that

Cruse presents a high risk of reoffending and recommended imprisonment.

(PSI,

pp.13-14.) At sentencing, the court stated:
. . . I can't be lenient with drug dealers. And that's why the legislature has
made the penalty for these two crimes, two penalties that you've pied
guilty to, a penalty up to life. That's how serious it is in this state. And it is
serious.
So when I impose a three plus four on you for dealing, I am even in
that sense being somewhat lenient. So when I take into account that I
have to deter other dealers, I have to punish you for what this is. This is a
terrible [sic] that you did. You're not a terrible person. You did a terrible
thing, and I have to do some kind of protection of our community from
drug dealers. I want everybody to get that message.
(5/7/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.11-25.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed
appropriate sentences, reasonably determining that Cruse was not a viable candidate
for the retained jurisdiction program or probation.

The sentences imposed are

appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offenses and the damage such offenses do
the community, Cruse's continuing decisions to engage in criminal behavior, and his
high risk to reoffend.

Given any reasonable view of the facts, Cruse has failed to

establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.
Cruse next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion.

If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Cruse must "show that the sentence is
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excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district

kl

court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

Cruse has failed to satisfy his burden.

Cruse provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.10104.) At the Rule 35 hearing, he merely reiterated his remorse and his desire to be
placed in the retained jurisdiction program.

(6/25/12 Tr., p.38, L.9 - p.41, L.6.) On

appeal, Cruse argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion "[f]or the same reason" that it abused its discretion by declining to retain
jurisdiction at the time of sentencing. In denying Cruse's Rule 35 request for leniency,
the district court again informed Cruse that sentence reductions were not appropriate in
light of the seriousness of his crimes and the need to protect society. (6/25/12 Tr., p.41,
L.7 - p.42, L.25.) The state submits that by failing to establish his sentences were
excessive as imposed, Cruse has also failed to establish the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Cruse's convictions and
sentences and the district court's order denying Cruse's Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence.

DATED this 2 nd day of April, 2013.

LORI A. FLEM!
Deputy Attorney
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of April, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
PO BOX 2772
BOISE, ID 83701
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Deputy Attorney Gen
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